6 March 1935
Part 2
He whom the flame of jealousy encompasseth, turneth at last, like the scorpion, the poisoned sting against himself.
"People in conflict between good and evil as a rule don't undergo such a terrible battle as those in whom virtues are clashing, where two perfectly good things fight against each other. That is the worst. That is civil war where brothers are slaying each other. It is a sort of poisonous war because you cannot deny that this idea is good and that idea is good and that they are irreconcilable. Suicide may result from such a conflict more than from a case of clear good and evil; one would hardly commit suicide on account of the fact that one does not like to steal, but one might if one is in conflict between morality and compassion, say."
Mrs. Adler: That would only mean named virtues?
Prof. Jung: It is always under the supposition here that virtues are specified by names. He says, "My brother, if thou be fortunate then wilt thou have one virtue and no more." That means an indistinct virtue, not a named one.
Mrs. Adler: If those virtues were not named, then the conflict would not be possible?
Prof. Jung: Well, of course if they are not formulated, such conflicts cannot take place; then it is the one value that rules the whole thing and you have not assumed the power by giving it a name. You see, we usurp something by giving it a name. We say it is this and nothing else, and think we have the purest substance of the thing when we name it. It is like qualifying a thing, as when one says that this is such and such a man.
How can we say what a man is?— or what man is in general? He is millions of things.
"By saying he is such and such a man, you have classified him and then he is no longer free. If he allows it, he will be forced into that category. Usually we defend ourselves against being put into cages.
But he State puts everybody into a category, and popular movements do it, and the church—those who belong to it are marvelous people and otherwise they belong to the devil.
"Virtues are gifts. I may have the faculty of being kind as someone else has the faculty of playing the piano, and as others have the moral art: they just have the gift of being nice or being good . Those are all gifts, and the poisonous thing is making a morality of it and imagining it to be a merit. If you are musical it is no merit; if you are a red parrot it is no merit. It is just so. So you see, if you don't give names, then it remains more or less a natural fact. It is not differentiated and it will work as something in nature will work."
"Primitives have exquisite manners. They have immense virtues and immense vices, but they work more or less smoothly together, so that a fairly round individual appears. Of course, it is wholly unconscious because it is not named.
If they said, "Now I am compassionate, now I am just," they would have an inflation and of course they would then be one—sided;
They would be at once in conflict with their surroundings and with themselves if they were capable of having a moral conflict at all."
"It is tremendously important to give a name to a thing—it may really save you from demons and disintegration and chaos. To be able to name things is man's greatest prerogative. But you can see what they made of it—having nothing but names."
"If you call a certain tendency or psychological movement in a man "sexuality," then it is just sexuality and you have spoiled the whole thing: it becomes absolutely unmanageable and you can do nothing at all with it. You make the same mistake if you call it "spiritual." If you give it a certain name you qualify it, put it into prison, into a drawer, or a cage, and you can no longer handle it because that name is all wrong. But if you give the right name to a thing, ah, that is some thing else; there you have acquired a power over nature. Science chiefly consists in an attempt of man to give the right names to things, and science is a great achievement of man."
"Giving a name to a thing creates a sort of abstraction, you remove a thing from life by having abstracted it; then in order to bring it back into life you have to undo the attempt, give up the name, and that would be re-abstraction. Nietzsche is really trying that here. He tries to dissolve the abstraction of differentiated concepts into nameless experiences.
He does so be cause he has been tremendously impressed by the utterly irrational experience of Zarathustra; he is filled with that experience and he believes in it, so he wants to convey it to everybody. Therefore, this particular admonition: don't name your virtue, in order that the virtue may remain an unutterable value which will lead you in the right way. Don't use too much man's prerogative of giving names, for thus you are not creating life substance but killing it. Now, the idea of this last sentence, "He whom the flame of jealousy encompasseth, turneth at last, like the scorpion, the poisened sting against himself," is that the one who is in a raging battle of ideas or moral duties will eventually kill himself. He will go under in this fight."
Man is something that hath to be surpassed: and therefore shalt thou love thy virtues,—for thou wilt succumb by them.
"If you try to follow up your virtues, you cannot avoid naming them, and then you will get into that battle which will eventually destroy you. And that is exactly what he wants: man ought to be surmounted. This man must be killed in favor of the Superman; otherwise he cannot produce the Superman.
This, curiously enough, is a Christian idea, and I brought a picture which illustrates it. It is a codex of the thirteenth century from the Bibliothèque de Besançon, Jesus—Christ crucifie par les vertus dont il avait ete le modele("Jesus crucified for the virtues for which he had been the model.")
He is being crucified by all the named virtues; one is hammering the nails into his feet and his hands, another one is stabbing his side, and so on. His virtues have really brought that painful death upon him—obviously a very Christian idea. That is medieval philosophy, you see. To that extent could they draw the conclusion that it was really the virtues, not the devils, which brought Christ to his cross. Now what does this symbolize?
Mrs. Fierz: Is it not the idea of the enantiodromia?—if you go to the very end of the thing then it must change.
Prof. Jung: Oh yes, it is an enantiodromia, but more important here is the thought that it was not the evil people—those evil Jews or Romans or whoever they were—who crucified Christ. It was his virtues, his greatness, that really led him to the cross; consciousness of those qualities, the named virtues, killed him, tore him to bits. And the cross is, of course, the well-known individuation symbol, which means that individuation is the necessary outcome of moral development. If you are consistent in the moral development you get into the moral conflict and into the role of Christ, namely, into the process of individuation."
Excerpts from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra notes of the seminar given in 1934-1939.

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