6 March 1935
Part 1
My brother, when thou hast a virtue, and it is thine own virtue, thou hast it in common with no one. To be sure, thou wouldst call it by name and caress it; thou wouldst pull its ears and amuse thyself with it. And lo! Then hast thou its name in common with the people, and hast become one of the people and the herd with thy virtue. Better for thee to say: "Ineffable is it, and nameless, that which is pain and sweetness to my soul, and also the hunger of my bowels."
"Nietzsche's idea would be that virtue is the thing which one has in common with none, because the highest virtue or virtus of a man is that he is himself. Individuality, self-ness—not selfishness—is the one quality which he has in common with none, because the self is utterly unique, and inasmuch as the self is realized in an individual it means uniqueness. And uniqueness means isolation, and it means also loneliness looked at from a human point of view, for it is differentiation, and a thing which is different is all by itself and not in any sort of participation; it is not connected by underground channels where the real life comes from. It is really and properly isolated, and therefore comparable to none."
"If you bring a thing which is nameless down into the sphere of the collective, you become part of collectivity, a herd particle; you have impoverished or reduced a uniqueness to a collective thing. Then the highest value has sunk to the level of a coin that can be found in anybody's pocket."
Let thy virtue be too high for the familiarity of names, and if thou must speak of it, be not ashamed to stammer about it.
"By giving a name to your virtue, you will disenchant it, lower it, deteriorate it to a collective level; and then it would not be your individual accomplishment. It would be just a character quality and no longer the excellence of your uniqueness."
Thus speak and stammer: "That is my good, that do I love, thus doth it please me entirely, thus only do I desire the good."
"Here he expresses the idea that having a virtue means a general indescribable good, a value that presides, one could say, over the whole of oneself; and you should not name it in order not to create the wrong appearance—as if you could put that good into your pocket and use it when it pleases you. It should appear, even in your formulation, as something which is in your being generally. It is always there and it will act when it pleases. You see, that is at the same time a formulation for the relation to the self, as an everlasting presence that cannot be disposed of and that cannot be named—that is there self-evidently, and will work by its own virtue."
"Usually people with common sense are lacking in uncommon sense."
Thus shouldst thou stammer, and praise thy virtue.
"By that he means you cannot possibly talk clever words about virtue, the uncommon efficacy of the self; you cannot say anything definite about it because it is greater than you. You can only stammer as if in the presence of a greater one. And you are right if you stammer and are embarrassed, not finding suitable terms or analogies. Then you do justice to it."
Once hadst thou passions and calledst them evil. But now hast thou only thy virtues; they grew out of thy passions.
"This is rather unexpected; it is as if a new thought were beginning here. The question obviously has occurred to him: But why virtue? Virtue is something very positive, but where is the shadow? Where is the negative side of virtue? Where is vice? And he comes to passion, because passion is supposed to be the mother of all vice: evil passions are surely vices. So he cannot consider the idea of virtue without considering at the same time its negation. You see, he makes something very great of his conception of virtue, and I think we are perfectly right in assuming that he really means the self. Now the self surely is the greatest borderline concept we possibly could invent. It is a great symbol, and it includes also the darkness. We would be quite wrong in assuming that the self is what we would call "wholly positive." It has its own negation, casting a shadow because it is also material, not only what we call "spiritual.""
"He is anticipating modern psychology when he sees virtue in connection with passions; he understands that the self consists of pairs of opposites and that it is in a way a reconciliation of opposites. But he does not say that here, so one must leave it out of consideration."
"We can only hope to become balanced between light and shadow—that is practically all we can hope for, no more. It is a catastrophic illusion to think that one can jump out of one's skin and be an angel from henceforth."
"Virtues, like all things which are named and specified, easily get into a quarrel; a virtue which is named has the disagreeable quality of being very imperious. Justice, being named, wants to be nothing but justice, and of course it gets into conflict right away with compassion; one cannot be just and compassionate at the same time because justice must be hard and cruel, otherwise it is not justice. Fiat justitia pereat mundus("Let justice be done though the world fall."). And true and essential compassion, compassion as it should be, from the standpoint of man cannot be just. And so on. So a man who really tries to be virtuous, having named his virtues that is, is always heading for tremendous moral difficulties, the so-called conflict of conscience, where the two goods clash. Then he does not know whether he should be more compassionate or more just or more respectable or more moral,—or should he be more human? The more he has all these marvellous virtues and the more he believes in them, the more he gets into a hell of a conflict between them; he will create one collision after the other between his own virtues."
My brother, if thou be fortunate, then wilt thou have one virtue and no more: thus goest thou easier over the bridge.
"If you call it 'justice" then it must produce nothing but justice, because you have caught it in the cage of your concept. You see, a concept is what you have grasped in that particular form; you have stolen that value and put it into a cage and then it can only produce what you say it should produce. It is no longer a general value of personality."
Illustrious is it to have many virtues, but a hard lot; and many a one hath gone into the wilderness and killed himself, because he was weary of being the battle and battlefield of virtues.
"Here he refers to one who has sustained too many moral conflicts, not between good and evil but between two goods, which is worse. A battle between good and evil is easily won. You can slay the devil by the aid of all sorts of helpful ideas and institutions, public support. Everybody will shake your hand and congratulate you on having slain the dragon. But to slay another virtue is harder: there you gain no recognition."
"Just because you believe in that one virtue, you will have offended against all others."
My brother, are war and battle evil? Necessary, however, is the evil; necessary are the envy and the distrust and the backbiting among the virtues.
"He puts it very plainly here: each ideal claims the whole man, for provided one names the virtue, each virtue claims its own essence. If one says it is justice then it must be the justest justice, otherwise justice is not satisfied and will keep on grumbling; if you allow your compassion to make you deviate from the path of justice, then justice will begin to complain. And if your justice violates your feeling of compassion, then it will be compassion that is wailing and lamenting."
Excerpts from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra notes of the seminar given in 1934-1939.
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