(17) "One often finds very basic trans-subjective experiences at the bottom of cases of insanity; they are of such an impressive nature that people are spell­ bound and forget all about humanity, they simply fall into the archetypal experience and disappear."

5 December 1934

 

When Zarathustra heard the wise man thus speak, he laughed in his heart: for thereby had a light dawned upon him. And thus spake he to his heart: A fool seemeth this wise man with his forty thoughts: but I believe he knoweth well how to sleep.


"The spirit or conscious attitude alone cannot evoke the new value; it emerges out of the dual play.

...the message of the old man of the woods retransforms in Zarathustra, and that each time they meet there is an attempt, however unconscious, at reconciliation, as if a new focus or new perspective had been established."

"Any new truth is in opposition to the old truth. It is impossible to create without being in opposition to the thing that has been; the spirit of the time past is necessarily in opposition to the coming spirit, as the spirit prevailing now is in opposition to the one of the past. So we could say the spirit of the past forms the shadow of the spirit that is or that is to come. As in a time when the spirit of the past was still uppermost, still a ruling picture, the spirit of the future would be the shadow, because it would not yet be in the actual light. Inasmuch as Zarathustra exists, the light, the moment of greatest intensity, is embodied in himself, and the old wise man of the woods is the shadow.

But as far as we can see here, the wisdom of the old man is in a way perfectly valid: that we keep awake in order to have sound sleep afterwards is also a point of view."

"Since man has to sleep, it can be a goal, and particularly for a sleepless person.

Now, the fact that Nietzsche was sleepless is explained through that intensity, that excess of light, that identity with Zarathustra, who is of course sleepless. Zarathustra is a figure of the unconscious that not only lives during the night, but during the day as well, because any archetypal figure is in a timeless condition—or at all events in a condition which cannot be compared to what we call time.

Therefore, all archetypes have the particular quality of eternity, which is simply another word for timelessness; or it may be a different quality of time that is typical for archetypes. And therefore Plato said that the archetypes, or the eidola, the images, were eternally preserved in a heavenly place because they had that character of timelessness; they are forever there, they never change. So, when you identify with an archetype in an inflation, your sleep is very often disturbed."

"That condition of identity with an archetype naturally makes the old stand­ point, which would allow one to sleep, particularly precious; and therefore, inasmuch as you want to hold to your new insight, you must fight the old, despite the fact that it is perhaps right, that it is common sense.

And you particularly have to fight the continuous longing to return to the condition in which you were protected against the identity with archetypes.

That identity is a torture, and naturally everything in you aches for liberation, and tries to go back to the protected condition where the archetypes are caught in symbols, in dogmas or in forms."

That is the reason, for instance, why a man like Angelus Silesius, the German poet and philosopher, having realized the relativity of God (which was remarkable for his time), finally regressed into the Catholic church; he could not stand the extraordinary wakefulness of the idea, that devouring light. He was simply forced to seek shelter in the Catholic dogmatic forms where there seemed to be peace for him.

But he forgot altogether that, having touched a new truth, retreat would mean the denial of the divine light and the return into darkness, into the thing which should have been overcome. So he was really denying his best.

It was as if Nietzsche should say: "Oh, that damned Zarathustra makes me sleepless and excited, I cannot stand this new thing,"—and make a regression into the Lutheran church or, still farther, into the Catholic church. Then what would become of Nietzsche? Then he would make no point any longer; he would be settled forever, though he might think that he could sleep then. But he would simply become hellishly neurotic.

He would destroy himself quite certainly, like Angelus Silesius, who began as a Protestant, then went far beyond Protestantism in his vision, and then, unable to stand it, returned and regressed into the Catholic church, where he became a bad neurotic, really a fiend. He lived in a monastery where his sole occupation was to write pamphlets reviling Protestantism, and that was his end.

If Nietzsche had denied Zarathustra, he would probably have come to his end much sooner, he also would have become an awful neurotic, and Zarathustra would never have been written at all."

Protestant authorities attacked and denounced Silesius in print for his Catholic and mystical beliefs, as with this caricature from the Wohlverdientes Kapitel (1664) depicting him as a peddler of potions, rosaries, gambling cards and dice, spectacles, and other immoral wares.


"Catholic church holds that you can only attain the forgiveness of sins or redemption through the sacraments, by the means of grace of the church. Of course that is man's work; it is a limitation of the powers of God.

As the idea that you can only be saved through faith is man's work, it is a limitation of the possible intervention of God.

If God chooses to save a man against his faith he can do so if he pleases. You see, if I want, I can do something against my own principles apparently. If people say that I am bound by what they think are my principles, I am not free if I comply. Instead, I shall do everything in my power to prove to them that I am not what they suppose I am; I shall do just the contrary because I am a free being.

The more you create such constructions, such images and limitations, the more you drive out the living spirit, and then the living spirit will appear in an entirely different place."

"Catholic dogma, the idea that you cannot be saved without the means of grace of the church for instance, that it needs the intercession of the church. Or that you cannot enter the kingdom of heaven without partaking of the communion, the body of Christ, as administered by the church. This was the cause of the conflict between the Swiss Reformer Zwingli and Luther. Zwingli said that the communion was symbolic and not the real body of Christ. It only meant the body of Christ, a metaphor in other words. And against that Luther wrote on the table at which they were sitting during the discussion the Greek word estin, because in the Greek text it says, "This is my flesh, this is my blood," and not "This means my blood." But Zwingli was already more liberal and insisted that it was only a memorial meal and was not to be taken literally—with that, of course, exploding the means-of-grace idea, the particular metaphysical magic which Luther wanted to preserve in order to save the church. For the church makes no sense whatever without the sacrament."

"You assume that those old things have collapsed into fantasies and imagination and forget entirely that they once had an extraordinary intensity and life. And you don't know that you secretly canalize a huge river into your unconscious. You think all the time that you have only gathered up the remains, those nails and screws and door-handles and so on which belong to you. You store them away and if nothing happens you forget entirely that an enormous manifestation of life and libido went into all that. And you now have the whole thing in your unconscious, where it causes a tremendous tension. That is the tension, the dynamis, which is pushing Zarathustra up to the surface, so that even the sleeplessness cannot convince Nietzsche that he should dismiss that figure. Zarathustra is too strong for him—not even sleeplessness counts."

"At the time of the Reformation more and more people felt that nothing from beyond came to them, that they were safely cut off from beyond, that all things divine were on this side of the river, in the visible church for instance, in man-made images, ideas, rites, and so on. And they missed the beyond, the trans-subjective fact, without which no religious experience is possible. So one can say their religious experience was nil; it was Anempfindung, a sort of aesthetic feeling into, an imagining that one has experienced, but it was not the real experience."

"The very fact that Protestantism insists so much on faith shows the weakness of their situation. It shows that nobody has actual experience, for the trans-subjective reality in which you ought to believe is exceedingly doubtful."

"If a thing has relation to us, it is relative to us and we are relative to it. And so the experience of an absolute god is excluded: that is only a man-made word.

If I were God, I would not be absolute. I would relate myself to human beings, for I would like to do something to them and I would like them to do something to me. To be absolute means that there is no creation. Before the creation of the world God was bored to tears, the old records say. He got awful headaches and finally contracted until the first light came forth because he simply could not stand his immense worldwide loneliness. You know, all the symptoms of modern Christian conviction are very doubtful. If anybody insists upon his absolute reliability and honesty, I know he lies; for why does he insist upon it? Why cannot we take it for granted that he is an honest and reliable being? Obviously he himself does not, so he preaches it. When I was a child it already sounded very queer to me to hear: "You ought to believe." I always said: "Do you know? Have you had any experience?" Otherwise, you can say what you please: it carries no conviction what­ ever."


Ah, ye brethren, that God whom I created was human work and human madness, like all the Gods! A man was he, and only a poor fragment of a man and ego. Out of mine own ashes and glow it came unto me, that phantom. And verily, it came not unto me from the beyond! 

 

'Now, the statement which Nietzsche makes here is not a subjective whim or his personal point of view. He simply gives voice to the general fact that our modern conception of religion completely lacks primordial experience. So I think he quite rightly says: "it came not unto me from the beyond." This "coming from the beyond" is most impressive in its brevity; you might easily read past it without paying particular attention, but it is of the utmost importance.

Belief or faith is your own activity, as what you touch or see, what you experience, is all your own making. You are entirely in the world of known things even if you approach God, which is the strangest thing you can imagine. You discover that you believe in God and if you did not he would not be. God would be nowhere, he could do nothing. You must believe and then he begins to operate. Your belief instigates such a phantom; you can inflate the phantom till it exists, but it is all your own body, your own make. So you are completely cut off from the beyond by your very faith. I say to people: "For heaven's sake, don't believe; we know nothing, we have no experience, so in what and why should I believe?" If it is a thing which I create, I then simply envelop myself in the cloak of my own imagination. I blindfold myself b y a self-created veil.

The beyond is the trans-subjective, and this is the experience of something within that sphere you call psyche or mind, which is not your own make, which is very clearly an intercessio divina—an intervention of something which is not yourself and which is not a part of our external world. It must be an effect within your innermost self, where you are quite alone with yourself, where certainly nothing else exists. Then if something happens there which is clearly not yourself, you know it is from beyond. It is trans-subjective."

"Just what the unconscious is we don't know. To call it "the unconscious" is merely façon de parler. You can call it "the dark continent," or "heaven," or "hell," or anything you like: it is simply something from the unknown. When you recognize the unknown as a really existing thing, you have had the trans-subjective experience."

"Make the simple experiment of criticizing your own thoughts. You have a certain opinion about something, and when I ask you if that is what you really think, you say, "No, I must think what my idea of it really is." And then you come to the conclusion that you think something quite different. Now, how did you come to that other opinion? Did you make it? "No, it was just there." Who then produced it? Who had the intention or the will to create such an opinion? If you can realize that, you have had a trans-subjective experience. Therefore I say, don't identify with your animus. That is not yourself, that is a trans-subjective reality. And mind you, the animus is as terrible a reality as the anima.

If a man takes it for granted that his moods are just himself, he has an anima inflation and makes a fool of himself. But if he can criticize his moods, he asks himself, "Is this really my feeling?" By no means. His real feeling is even suppressed in favor of that nonsense, an emotion which is really strange to him. And if he can make this a real experience, he has realized a trans-subjective reality. That is the way I came to the conception of the anima. I criticized my emotions and came to the conclusion that they were not myself. They were simply made for me, so I asked myself, "Now who on earth can produce such things in me?" I was almost inclined to believe in witchcraft. That was of course the origin of witchcraft and why men still say they are bewitched; they naively feel that their emotions are not their own. A man who is bewitched is filled with intense feelings which he thinks must come from somewhere, and then he discovers a red-haired girl and thinks she is responsible—and then he could kill her for witchcraft. But if he had a philosophical mind, he would understand that this is a trans-subjective reality which he must not project into a red-haired girl."

"I always say to people on the borderline. "As long as you can explain yourself and feel the need of explaining yourself to a human being, and succeed more or less, you are not crazy." But it is characteristic of insane people that they go on talking without caring or knowing whether they are understood, disregarding the rapport, disregarding the impression they make."

"People who disregard the effect they have on other people are on the way to insanity, even if they are still within the normal. In other words, as soon as they become unconscious of what they do and what it means, they are on the way to insanity because they cut the human relation and then there is no guarantee that they won't get lost."

"One often finds very basic trans-subjective experiences at the bottom of cases of insanity; they are of such an impressive nature that people are spell­ bound and forget all about humanity, they simply fall into the archetypal experience and disappear."

"The more one-sided the type the more certain it is that the experience will be killed, because the superior function is then so powerful that it simply assimilates everything; whatever happens, such a person will declare it to be all in his world, and if it is something too extraordinary he simply says it is not true."

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