(22.2) "When functions are differentiated in a one-sided way, when you are always living on one function, then that function gets the better of you and insists that the whole meaning of life is nothing but that.."

13 February 1935

Part 2

"Logos also contains the idea of the word; legein means to talk, to speak. It is another characteristic of man that he insists upon giving voice to an idea, designating it, giving a name, making a concept, expressing it, while woman, characterized more by Eros, can leave things in suspenso; they have not necessarily to be said. A man says, "Why the devil don't you say so?" but a woman doesn't need to say so, and usually she doesn't. Or she says something else, and a man is always convinced that she has said just the thing she should not have said, for to his mind she does not designate, does not put her finger on it, doesn't make the word.

Therefore, men's ideas about women—about their talk, you know: gossip and afternoon tea, that intricate talk, the indirect vague way of women. If he carefully follows up such a conversation, however, he sees that she is like a spider weaving a web, relating things by secret threads, and some fly suddenly flies into the net and wonders how the devil it got there.

The talk of women, being roundabout, doesn't consist of words but of spider webs, and they have a purpose different from that of a man. He means, "This is a chair, damn you, and it is not a footstool." This is interesting to him; he establishes this particular distinguishing factor. But it is not interesting to a woman: if this is not a chair it is a footstool and one can sit on a footstool if there is no chair. As my uncle used to say, "If man had not invented a spoon by which to stir the soup, you women would still go on stirring the soup with a stick." To a woman it doesn't matter so much. It only matters inasmuch as a difference must be covered up or related; a bridge must be made in between, and that is the weaving of plots.

The natural mind of a woman consists chiefly in weaving plots. That is no joke, but a fact. It is not a libel against women. It is just so: in their natural mind they establish spider webs, threads leading from here to there which connect them up. Eventually a woman gets herself in it as well; it is a very serious business. Many a woman who has woven a plot was the fly in the spider's web. They are natural spiders, because they can thus find out about connections. You see, that is Eros. But such a description should be poetic, really, in order to be convincing."

"Science insisted upon just making straight lines through nature by arithmetical laws. That is the designating character of the Logos."

"The genealogical instinct of woman is tremendous—who is the grandson of whom, who is the great grandaunt of this one. That is an important item of female conversation, and it is another application of the same principle. Of course, not when women with great minds are gathered together!—but ordinary women's conversation.

They are always informed about an entirely different world from man's world; man's world is strange to that kind of mind, as a woman's world is strange to a man. He simply does not see things under that aspect. Therefore, Anatole France is quite right when he says that when men have worked things up to a fix, they must call in an intelligent woman, a saint, to solve the riddle, to untie the Gordian knot; you can read this in L'Isle des Penguins, a very instructive book.

The Logos, then, is an intuitive concept that covers tentatively a large field of observational experience which cannot be summed up in any known form; with no forms in which to catch it, it is the nearest we can get to it."


What the sense feeleth, what the spirit discerneth, hath never its end in itself. But sense and spirit would fain persuade thee that they are the end of all things: so vain are they.


Mrs. Baumann: In this translation, Sinn is called "mind." Is that right?

Prof Jung: Well, unfortunately it means sense too, and the word sense surely is not identical with mind. It is definitely what we call sense. And Sinn can also be translated by "meaning"; Wilhelm translates Tao by Sinn for instance, while others call Tao "meaning." Sinn often means Gemüt, and Gemütlichkeit is most definitely an emotional feeling which by a peculiar lack of differentiation is mixed up with sensation, Empfindung, so the sense quality comes in there too. That is due to the fact that in the Germanic mind the functions of feeling and sensation are not properly differentiated yet; one sees it all over the place, being everywhere obvious.

Gemüt or Gemütlichkeit is an unfathomable soup of sensation and feelings and emotions. And Gemütlichkeit is pregnant with all sorts of objects and associations; it smells of beer and tobacco and blood-and-liver sausages and sauerkraut. There are people sitting around a stove in a warm room with a low smoke-blackened ceiling, and there is a coffeepot, and they drink and talk slowly, and it is evening and very nice and comfortable. All these things belong and must be mentioned in order to know what Gemütlichkeit means. It is a wonderfully primitive concept. There is no word in the world so pregnant as Gemüt. It is amazing what happens when you say that word. It is as comprehensive as a mantra; you draw in realities. When you say "sense," God! that is poor; when you say "mind," the meaning is too definite; when you say "meaning," you ask what meaning, you draw nothing in; but if a German says Gemüt or Gemütlichkeit, he does not need to ask what or where or who.

Mr. Allemann: Would it be "homely" or "homelike" in English?

Prof Jung: Well, that is not the same by far. They just don't possess such a word. It is still primitive. I am sure there are such words in Russian, or any other primitive languages, words that describe plastic situations. So the Germans still have words of power: they produce. For instance, when men come together and it is not particularly interesting and there is no particular point in it and something ought to be done about the situation, they say: wir wollen Gemütlich sein. There it is. Somebody speaks the mantra and he has created something. So, as I say, Sinn has an emotional aspect and then it is a sort of Gemült; it has a sensation aspect and then it is Sinnlichkeit; and it has an intellectual aspect which is meaning."

"I would say that either awareness, or sense, or mind, or intellect, or spirit in a metaphysical sense—always try to persuade us that, by their results or their statements, the ultimate truth could be established—and that would be the meaning of life altogether. For instance, the scientific intellect makes it a purpose of its existence to establish a truth, as if that were the real goal of life; and as mentality could be made the goal of life, so another function can make another goal, create another meaning of life, and try to persuade us that is the only thing.

When functions are differentiated in a one-sided way, when you are always living on one function, then that function gets the better of you and insists that the whole meaning of life is nothing but that.

But if you know that you are not identical with a function—if you are the subject of your functions, not the object—then you can say, my goal is so and so, and the function is subservient.

That is what Nietzsche wants to bring about. Naturally, if you are identical with one function, that function tries to persuade you that its data, its realities, are the meaning of your life. Therefore, you should see that you are the master of your functions, that you are the subject of your functions, and not the object."

Excerpts from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra notes of the seminar given in 1934-1939.

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